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In Meadows v Khan,1 a mother brought a wrongful birth claim against a general 
practitioner for the additional costs2 of raising her son, who had been born with both 
hæmophilia and autism. The judge stated the legal issue to be decided as follows: 
'Can a mother who consults a doctor with a view to avoiding the birth of a child with 
a particular disability (rather than to avoid the birth of any child) recover damages 
for the additional costs associated with an unrelated disability?'3 The question was 
not covered by any previous reported case.4 The stakes riding on it were high. The 
additional costs associated with the hæmophilia alone had been agreed at £1.4m: 
those associated with both conditions, at £9m.5 
The claimant, desiring to avoid having a hæmophiliac child, had undergone medical 
testing to assess that risk. The claimant's doctor ordered tests appropriate for 
determining whether she herself was a hæmophiliac, but not whether she carried the 
hæmophilia gene. The defendant advised the claimant that her test results were 
normal, leading the claimant to believe that she was not at risk of having a 
hæmophiliac child. The claimant then became pregnant and gave birth to her son: he 
was affected by severe hæmophilia and, it was subsequently discovered, autism (an 
ætiologically-unrelated condition). The autism was sufficient to prevent the son from 
ever living independently or taking up paid employment. Further, due to the autism 
the son would not be able to manage his hæmophilia independently, such that the 
additional costs associated with that disorder were increased.6 
It was admitted that but for the doctor's negligence the mother would have 
discovered the hæmophilia through fetal testing, and terminated her pregnancy. The 
mother's claim for additional costs associated with the child's hæmophilia was 
admitted.7 Her claim for additional costs associated with the autism was disputed.  
                                                   
1 See also Lauren Sutherland QC, 'Causation in wrongful birth' (2018) 140 Reparation Bulletin 6–8. 
2 'Additional' to those which would normally incurred in raising a healthy child. 
3 Meadows, [2] 
4 Meadows, [51] 
5 Meadows, [4]. The reference to 'additional costs relating [only] to [the claimant's child's] autism', 
rather than 'hæmophilia', is clearly an error. 
6 Meadows, [7] 
7 The increase in costs associated with the hæmophilia due to the child's autism may have been 
included in the admitted sum, on an 'eggshell-skull' basis, but the judgment is silent on this point. 
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Finding against the doctor, the judge awarded full compensation to the claimant, 
whose truly daunting predicament had been caused (in a but-for sense) by the 
negligence of her doctor.  
As a matter of English law, the judge was wrong to do so. The analysis of her 
reasoning affords an opportunity to examine how the scope-of-liability principles 
established in South Australia Asset Management Corpn v York Montague 
(SAAMCO)8 and subsequent authorities, particularly Hughes-Holland v BPE 
Solicitors,9 ought to be applied in clinical negligence matters arising from failures to 
warn of risks. 
It is worth recalling the principles established in SAAMCO and Hughes-Holland. 
Where a defendant is in breach of a duty to take reasonable care in providing 
information or advice, a distinction is drawn between two questions. The first is 'the 
assessment of the loss caused by the breach of duty'; the second is 'the extent of the 
defendant's duty to protect the claimant against it'.10 In relation to the second 
question, where the defendant's role is to provide some information to be used in 
conjunction with other matters identified by the claimant, in deciding upon a course 
of action, the defendant's liability is limited to the foreseeable consequences of the 
information supplied being wrong. This is so even if the information supplied by the 
defendant is, and is known to be, of decisive importance to the claimant. Where the 
defendant's role is, more broadly, to identify and consider all relevant matters, and 
generally to advise the claimant as to the course of action to adopt, the defendant's 
liability extends to all foreseeable consequences of that course of action being taken.11  
In Meadows, it was apparently conceded that the claim was virtually free from 
difficulties as regards duty, causation and remoteness: proximity and foreseeability 
were present, the autism 'resulted from … a natural chain of events from conception', 
and 'standard "but for" causation was made out'.12 The narrow issue raised by the 
defence related to the scope of the defendant's duty or liability. The judge noted: 'The 
purpose of the service offered by the defendant … was not to prevent the claimant 
having any child but rather, ultimately, to prevent her having a child with 
hæmophilia'.13 Accordingly, the defendant, referring to SAAMCO and Hughes-
Holland, argued that she had undertaken only to provide information relating to the 
risk that hæmophilia might affect the claimant's child, and not to advise generally on 
the merits of any potential pregnancy.14 
Rejecting these arguments, Yip J asserted that they adopted the wrong 'starting 
point'15: she preferred to begin by noting that the doctor's breach was a cause of the 
child's autism.16 This factor, re-emphasised at several points in the judgment,17 was 
relevant to the first question distinguished in SAAMCO—the assessment of the loss 
caused by the breach—but not to the second, central question regarding the scope of 
                                                   
8 [1997] AC 191 
9 [2017] UKSC 21; [2017] 2 WLR 1029 
10 Hughes-Holland, [27] (Lord Sumption); SAAMCO, 218A–C (Lord Hoffmann) 
11 SAAMCO, 214E–F (Lord Hoffmann); Hughes-Holland, [39]–[44] (Lord Sumption) 
12 Meadows, [22] 
13 Meadows, [26] 
14 Meadows, [31]–[46] 
15 Meadows, [52] 
16 Meadows, [53] 
17 E.g. Meadows, [56], [58], [62] 
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the defendant's liability. In her approach to this second question the judge's 
reasoning strayed into error.  
The judge's first error occurred in attempting to distinguish SAAMCO altogether, 
through misinterpreting Lord Hoffmann's example of the negligent doctor and the 
mountaineer's knee. In Lord Hoffmann's version of this 'legal parable',18 the 
counterfactual involved the doctor giving correct information about the unfit knee, 
resulting in the moutaineer's expedition being cancelled.19 Yip J's version, however, 
posited that 'if the advice about [the mountaineer's] knee had been right he would 
have gone on to climb the mountain and would have had the same accident'.20 This 
allowed the judge to conclude that whereas '[t]he risk that materialised [for the 
mountaineer] … had nothing to do with his knee … [h]ere … the risk that 
materialised had everything to do with the continuation of this pregnancy. The 
autism arose out of this pregnancy which would have been terminated but for the 
defendant's negligence'.21 Had Yip J employed Lord Hoffmann's uncorrupted 
counterfactual, the hypothetical cancellation of the mountaineer's expedition would 
have been closely analogous to the hypothetical termination of the pregnancy in 
Meadows. Thus, the judge ought to have concluded that, in the mountaineer's case, 
'the risk that materialised … [had everything to do with the expedition,] though 
nothing to do with his knee', just as in the Meadows case, 'the risk that materialised 
had everything to do with the continuation of this pregnancy[, though nothing to do 
with the hæmophilia]'.  
Rather than trying to distinguish SAAMCO, the judge ought to have recognised its 
close resemblance. Turning from the fictional mountaineer to the actual facts of 
SAAMCO, the claimant's pregnancy in Meadows, which arose as a result of the 
doctor's negligent advice, and which left the fetus exposed to a range of different 
risks, was clearly analogous to the mortgage loan transactions in SAAMCO, each of 
which had been prompted by a negligent valuation, and left the lender exposed to 
risks arising from several sources (i.e. from overvaluation of the security, movements 
in the property market, and the borrower's default). 
A further error on the judge's part was to seek to distinguish SAAMCO on the basis of 
'the crucial factor' that the 'disabled child resulted from a pregnancy afflicted by the 
very condition about which the doctor was consulted' (viz hæmophilia), and not by 
autism alone.22 In SAAMCO, the fact that each lender's loss resulted from a loan 
transaction 'afflicted' by inadequate security (the 'very condition' about which each 
valuer had been consulted), did not render each valuer liable for all losses arising 
from the loan. Only the losses attributable to each negligent overvaluation fell within 
the scope of the valuer's liability.  
The judge accepted that Meadows was an 'information' case: 'the focus of the 
defendant's duty, or the purpose of the service …, was to provide the claimant with 
the necessary information so as to allow her to terminate any pregnancy afflicted by 
hæmophilia'.23 Applying the SAAMCO 'information'/'advice' taxonomy, the 
                                                   
18 Hughes-Holland, [1] (Lord Sumption) 
19 SAAMCO, 213C 
20 Meadows, [55] (emphasis added) 
21 Meadows, [55] 
22 Meadows, [69] 
23 Meadows, [57] 
[Final corrected draft, J Thomson, 20180314] 
 4 
defendant's duty ought to have been limited accordingly. This the judge rejected.24 In 
doing so, she sought25 to draw analogies with Groom v Selby26 and Parkinson v St 
James Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust.27 Neither of these authorities were 
apt to assist. Groom involved a negligent failure by a doctor to detect and inform the 
claimant of her pregnancy, upon being consulted at an early stage. While Groom was 
also an 'information' case, in the circumstances the doctor's duty extended to 'the 
purpose of ensuring that if the claimant was indeed pregnant again she should be 
informed of this fact, so as to enable her to take appropriate steps to prevent the 
birth of another child if she wished'.28 The scope of the doctor's liability thus 
extended widely to the consequences of negligently failing to inform the claimant 
that she was pregnant with any child. Within that scope, the costs associated with 
raising a disabled child could be recovered.29 The scope of the doctor's liability was 
thus not a central issue in Groom. It was central in Meadows, where the doctor had 
undertaken to inform the claimant only about her risks of bearing a child afflicted by 
hæmophilia. As to Parkinson, which involved a negligently-performed sterilisation 
procedure: it was either wholly distinguishable, as not involving 'information' or 
'advice' at all, or it was akin to an 'advice' case, such that the scope of the doctor's 
liability encompassed all foreseeable consequences of the claimant becoming 
pregnant. 
Another erroneous strand of reasoning in Meadows began with the perceived 
similarities between that case and Chester v Afshar.30 Thus, in the probable 
counterfactual in Meadows, if the doctor had not been negligent the claimant would 
have terminated her first pregnancy and then, in the future, would have run the risk 
of having an autistic child again, by becoming pregnant again.31 This was, indeed, 
analogous to Chester. It could also be said, as in Chester, that on a balance of 
probabilities 'but-for' causation was established, because the probability of any child 
being born autistic was very low.32 The judge wrongly concluded, however, that she 
was justified in not applying SAAMCO because the case before her was closer to 
Chester.33 While there are difficult aspects to the reasoning of the majority in 
Chester,34 one aspect is tolerably clear: it is fundamentally concerned with the first 
question distinguished in SAAMCO (the assessment of the loss caused by a breach), 
whereas SAAMCO itself was primarily concerned with the second question (the scope 
of the defendant's liability for any such loss). Accordingly, there ought to have been 
no choice to be made between SAAMCO and Chester.  
                                                   
24 Meadows, [58], Yip J commenting that she found the distinction between 'information' and 'advice' 
cases 'unattractive, arbitrary and unfair'. 
25 Meadows, [62], [63], [71] 
26 [2001] EWCA Civ 1522; [2002] PIQR P18 
27 [2001] EWCA Civ 530; [2002] QB 266 
28 Groom, [23] (Brooke LJ) 
29 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] AC 59; Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust [2003] UKHL 52; [2004] 1 AC 309  
30 [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 AC 134 
31 Meadows, [41], [54] 
32 Meadows, [54] 
33 Meadows, [55] 
34 See e.g.: Tamsyn Clark and Donal Nolan, 'A Critique of Chester v Afshar' (2014) 32 OJLS 659, 375–
384; Craig Purshouse, 'Causation, coincidences and Chester v Afshar' (2017) 3 PN 220–224; Jeffrey 
Thomson, 'SAAMCO revisited' [2017] 76(3) CLJ 476, 479–480. 
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Tantalisingly, the facts of Meadows seemed apt to raise Chester's causation question, 
and as well as SAAMCO's scope-of-liability question . Had issues of causation not 
generally been conceded,35 then given the aforementioned similarities between 
Meadows and Chester, the claimant may have had difficulty in establishing 
causation at all. A first potential difficulty was that Meadows did not involve a failure 
to warn a patient about the risks of medical treatment, the class of cases to which the 
approach to causation in Chester may now be restricted.36 A second, more 
fundamental, difficulty was raised by the judge herself. Unlike Chester, it was not the 
case in Meadows that the 'misfortune which befell the claimant [viz autism] was the 
very misfortune which was the focus of the [defendant's] duty to warn [viz 
hæmophilia]'.37 This missing element had been, the judge admitted, a 'key part of the 
rationale' for finding that causation was established in Chester. 38 
This brings us neatly back to the issue of the scope of the defendant's liability, which, 
for reasons stated, was the focus of the argument in Meadows in any event. The 
judge ought to have applied SAAMCO and dismissed the claimant's claim for 
additional costs associated with her son's autism as falling outwith the scope of the 
defendant's duty. 
A final 'error' in the judgment in Meadows, identifiable with hindsight, was to 
consider 'the extent to which it would be fair, just and reasonable to hold the 
defendant liable for the costs related to [the child's] autism'.39 The parties were 
agreed that the case was not one which required any incremental development of 
existing categories of negligence liability: rather, 'each side said the answer lay in 
applying established principles to the particular facts'.40 Regarding the existence of a 
duty of care, the relevant principles had already been laid down in McFarlane, 
Parkinson, Groom, and Rees. Moreover if, properly conceived, the scope-of-liability 
enquiry is related to the more general enquiry as to the existence of a duty of care,41 
then its principles were established by cases like SAAMCO and Hughes-Holland. In 
such circumstances, as is now clear from Robinson v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire Police,42 it was unnecessary and inappropriate to reconsider issues of 
fairness, justice and reasonableness: the balancing of such issues already 'form[ed] 
part of the basis on which the law has arrived at the relevant principles', and those 
principles should simply have been applied.43 
Standing back, it would be understandable if some reluctance were felt to applying 
the scope-of-liability reasoning developed in cases of 'business' financial losses, like 
SAAMCO, to failure-to-warn claims in the clinical field which, while also concerned 
with economic loss, seem akin to claims for losses consequential upon personal 
                                                   
35 Meadows, [22]–[23] 
36 See White v Paul Davidson & Taylor (A Firm) [2004] EWCA Civ 1511; [2005] PNLR 15, [40]–[42] 
(Arden LJ) 
37 Meadows, [57] 
38 Meadows, [57]: and see Chester, [51]–[59], [62] (Lord Hope), [91]–[94], [101] (Lord Walker). 
39 Meadows, [23], [66]–[68]. 
40 Meadows, [22] 
41 See Rees, [84] (Lord Hutton), [106] (Lord Millett). But they are not identical enquiries; cf. 
SAAMCO, 212C (Lord Hoffmann): 'In the present case, there is no dispute that the duty of care was 
owed to the lenders. The real question in this case is the kind of loss in respect of which the duty was 
owed'. 
42 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4 
43 Robinson, [26]–[27], [29] (Lord Reed) 
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injury.44 Not to limit the scope of a doctor-defendant's liability in appropriate cases, 
however, would be contrary to general principle,45 a source of incoherence in the law 
and of potentially serious injustice. 
Jeffrey Thomson 
Lecturer in Law, The City Law School, City, University of London 
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44 E.g. Groom, [31] (Hale LJ) 
45 SAAMCO, 231C–D (Lord Hoffmann) 
